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PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS:
LET TUE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME
When thousands of Ford Pintos began exploding in fiery
rear-end crashes back in the 1970s, the victims knew who
to hold liable for the deaths and injuries. They went after
the manufacturer. But how, as a society, do we assess re-
sponsibility when the defective product is a troubled teen-
ager and the "manufacturer" is a parent?1
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is no clear consensus about the causes of juvenile
delinquency, bad parenting is included somewhere in the list. Crimi-
nology theories and empirical studies identify families, economic
status, academic achievement, peer groups, community attachment,
and susceptibility to the media as factors likely to affect a child's
tendency to become delinquent. 2 So, why recently, especially in the
aftermath of the Columbine High School incident and other school
shootings, are we as a society so anxious to point blame at parents
for the violent acts of their children? While there is evidence con-
necting "bad" parents to their children's delinquent behavior, clearly
parents are not the only cause.3 We are not even sure that they are
the primary cause. Yet, in the past three years, at least fifteen states
have enacted or amended civil and criminal parental responsibility
laws.4 The federal government is considering a bill with a provision
to make parents criminally responsible for providing children access
to guns. 5  Starting in 1998, the National Conference of State
1. Julie DelCour, When Are Parents to Blame?, TuLSA WORLD, May 2,
1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
2. See Tami Scarola, Note, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving Them:
Why Criminal Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Under-
standing of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1029, 1065 (1997).
3. See id. at 1057.
4. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part V.
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Legislatures made "restorative" or balanced juvenile justice a pri-
mary focus, advocating holding both juveniles and their parents ac-
countable for delinquent acts.
6
So, why the legislative finger-pointing at parents? According to
a Los Angeles attorney, this is "a statement that society is trying to
send through its legislators which is [that] they want parents to take
control of their children in order to protect society."7 Congressman
Henry Hyde seems to have summed up the public response to what
he calls a "coarsening of American life" witnessed through its youth:
"These tragic school shootings in recent months have fostered a na-
tional climate where we're all looking for answers." 8 Part of the an-
swer seems to be asking parents to properly police their children.
This Comment looks at whether parental responsibility laws are
indeed part of the solution to the juvenile crime problem. Part II fo-
cuses on the need for parental responsibility laws. Despite the de-
cline in the past few years of juvenile crime rates, sharp increases in
juvenile crime from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, plus a
present rate that is much higher than desired, foster reason to be con-
cerned. Also, public fear and attention to the impact of delinquency
on society certainly have not declined, and legislatures are reacting
with parental responsibility laws.
Part E looks at the history of parental responsibility laws, both
civil and criminal. While such statutes may not be a new concept,
enforcement of the statutes would be. This section discusses the
goals of parental responsibility laws, pointing out problem areas
needing resolution before these statutes can be truly effective.
Parts IV and V consider the public and legislative responses to
high-profile juvenile crimes such as the Columbine tragedy. While
6. See ADELIA YEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORTS: JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE STATE LAWS IN
1997 (1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, States Legal-U.S. File [here-
inafter NCSL I].
7. CNN Crossfire: Should Parents Be Hel Accountable for the Criminal
Acts of Their Children? (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 28, 1999) [hereinafter
CNN Crossfire] (unpublished transcript, on file with Federal Document Clear-
ing House) (quoting Gloria Allred).
8. U.S. Representative Henry Hyde, Remarks at the Meeting Chaired by
Senator Orrin Hatch on Juvenile Justice Legislation (Aug. 5, 1999) (transcript
available through Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts).
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the parental responsibility provision in the Youth Gun Crime En-
forcement Act of 19999 seems an appropriate and necessary re-
sponse, it must be properly applied and enforced. This is an area in
which other parental responsibility legislation has failed.
Finally, Part VI provides recommendations for parental respon-
sibility legislation so that it may more adequately achieve the result
of reducing juvenile delinquency through the parent. This author
suggests applying a "sliding scale" approach to parental offenders:
the more serious the crime, the more serious the punishment. Clearly
criminal parental responsibility statutes cannot succeed in a vacuum.
Therefore, implementing and applying social programs to deal with
less serious offenders would increase the effectiveness of criminal
sanctions. Parental responsibility laws may then become an effective
part of the answer for which society is looking.
II. THE NEED FOR PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LEGISLATION
Parental responsibility laws are largely a product of the 1990s.
Experts say that the recent introduction of such laws, holding parents
criminally and civilly liable for the delinquent acts of their children,
is the result of a seventy-five percent increase in juvenile crime from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. 10 The juvenile crime rate did, in
fact, peak in 1993 and has been steadily declining from 1993 to the
present.1 However, even with this decline, the present juvenile
9. Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, S. 995, 106th Cong. § 204;
Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 1768, 106th Cong. § 204.
See Appendix for full text of the bill.
10. See Joyce Howard Price, Killers'Parents Denied Immunity as Liability
Trend Grows in U.S., WASH. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at C7; see also FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 212 (1996) [hereinafter UCR 1995]
(citing a 67.3% increase in juvenile violent crime between 1986 and 1995, but
only a 31.4% increase in adult violent crime during that same period).
11. See Adam Spector, Indicators of Youth Violent Crime and Victimization
Show Continuing Declines (last modified July 8, 1999)
<http://www.childstats.gov/ac1999/teenrel.asp> (indicating that the 1997 juve-
nile violent crime rate of 31 crimes per 1000 youth in the general population
dropped from a high of 52 crimes per 1000 youth in 1993 and is the lowest rate
since 1986). In fact, the overall violent crime rate has also been dropping. See
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1997, at 12-13 (1998). The lowest
national crime rate since 1987 of 611 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants
June 2000] 1721
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1719
crime rate is still well above the mid-1980s level, 12 and the overall
crime rate is still particularly high among youths.
13
According to the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), "[s]uch good news [about the
recent decline in juvenile crime] ... should not foster complacency
nor lead us to weaken our efforts to combat violent juvenile crime,
which despite decreases is still too prevalent." 14 Of particular con-
cem is that juvenile violence has become more lethal, illustrated by
the doubling of the juvenile arrest rate for murder and weapons vio-
lations between 1987 and 1993.15 While, again, there has been a
steady decline since 1993 in firearm-related crimes, the present rate
is still twice as high as the 1984 rate. 16 Finally, America's violent
crime rate, despite recent declines, is still much higher than other
countries. For example, in Japan fifteen people were killed in
was reported in 1997. See id. at 12. As compared to the violent crime rates in
1993, there was a 4.4% drop in 1994, an 8.3% drop in 1995, a 14.8% drop in
1996, and an 18.2% drop in 1997. See id. at 13 chart 2.5.
12. In 1997, the rate ofjuvenile homicides was the lowest in the decade, but
was still 21% above the average of the 1980s. See HOWARD N. SNYDER &
MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT
53 graph (1999) [hereinafter 1999 NATIONAL REPORT]. For example, while
the number of known murder offenders, age 17, was approximately 400 in
1984, there were still approximately 800 known offenders in 1997, even after a
steady decline since a peak in 1994. See id.
13. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
LEGISLATIVE REPORTS: A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE (1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, States Legal-
U.S. File [hereinafter NCSL II] (reporting that while only 11% of the U.S.
population was aged 10 to 17 in 1994, children under age 18 accounted for
19% of violent crime arrests).
14. Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 1998, OJJDP JuV. JUST. BULL.
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.), Dec.
1999, at 1.
15. See Heike P. Gramckow & Elena Tompkins, Enabling Prosecutors to
Address Drug, Gang, and Youth Violence, JAIBG BULL. (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1999, at 2; see also
1999 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 54 (noting that while between 1980
and 1987, firearms were used in just over one-half of all homicides involving a
juvenile offender, by 1994, 82% of such homicides involved the use of a fire-
arm).
16. See 1999 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 54 graph.
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1996 with a handgun; in England, it was thirty; in the United States,
it was 9390.17
Importantly, public attitudes and fear of juvenile crime have not
steadily declined along with the youth crime rate. Concern for juve-
nile violent crime continues to reflect the rise in juvenile crime from
the mid-1980s through 1993.18 The public may have reason to be
concerned. Consider the following statistics. Fewer than one-half of
serious violent crimes by juveniles are, in fact, reported to law en-
forcement and, therefore, reflected in the above-cited statistics.
19
Even still, violent crimes committed by juveniles comprise one in
four of all violent crimes.20 It is estimated that by the year 2005, the
number of teens, ages fourteen to seventeen, who commit the major-
ity of violent crimes, will be twenty percent above the 1994 level.2'
Statistics concerning family conditions arguably also give rise to
concern. In 1998, only sixty-eight percent of American children
lived with two parents; both parents were employed full-time in
thirty-one percent of those homes, increasing from seventeen percent
17. See Carter Harris, Bill Bradley: He Has a Dream, VIBE, Mar. 2000, at
127, 128; see also Alan Travis, London Near Bottom of International Murder
League, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Aug. 19, 1998, at 7 (noting that Washington,
D.C., has a murder rate thirty-three times higher than London, while New York
City has a murder rate eight times higher than London).
18. For example, in a Gallup Poll survey conducted in May 1999, when
asked what is the most important problem facing America, 17% of those polled
said crime and violence, while another 18% said ethics, morals, and family de-
cline. These were the two highest-ranking responses, outnumbering education,
drugs, and poverty. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 96 (Kath-
leen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999)
19. See 1999 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 53, 63 (stating that in
1997 the FBI had no information on the offender for about 6900 reported mur-
ders, therefore, estimating that the 1400 reported murders attributable to juve-
niles is likely greater). In 1997, law enforcement agencies learned about only
51% of sexual assaults, 40% of robberies, and 42% of aggravated assaults
committed by juveniles. See id. at 63.
20. See Spector, supra note 11.
21. See Gramckow & Tompkins, supra note 15, at 2; see also Eric Licht-
blau, Juvenile Arrests in U.S. Decline, Belying Fears, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1999, at Al ("Federal estimates project that California will have the biggest
growth rate in the nation in its juvenile population, with a 34% increase by the
year 2015.").
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in 1980. 22 Also, children living with employed, single mothers rose
to forty-one percent in 1997.23 These statistics are important since
the number of parents living with a child is usually correlative to the
amount and quality of human and economic resources available to
that child.24 Family conditions with respect to divorce and family
cohesiveness are listed by the FBI as factors "known to affect the
volume and type of [juvenile] crime occurring from place to place."
25
As illustrated by these statistics, public attention to the problems
of juvenile violence may be appropriately placed. This may be a
necessary reaction to what is a prevalent problem, despite the recent
decline in the number of reported juvenile offenders. Undoubtedly,
perceptions of juvenile offenders have been influenced by the atten-
tion focused on high-profile incidents, such as the recent wave of
school shootings. 26 Yet, while the public's perceptions about juve-
nile crime may be partially based upon such rare, high-profile inci-
dents, the reactions to this attention are arguably desirable to combat
any future increases in juvenile crime rates overall.
27
As a result, according to the National Conference of State Leg-
islatures (NCSL), "[p]ublic fear of crime and concern that juveniles
are disproportionately responsible for violent crime in this country
have put juvenile justice reform high on state legislative agendas."
28
22. See FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY
STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-
BEING 7, 14 (1999).
23. See id. at 14.
24. See id. at 7; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Pa-
rental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 399, 424 ("[H]aving at least two
parental figures... correlates with a decrease in delinquent behavior.").
25. UCR 1995, supra note 10, at vi.
26. To support this statement, all one needs to do is look at the media at-
tention surrounding the Columbine tragedy and its aftermath. See Interview
with Katie Couric of the National Broadcasting Corporation, 35 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DoC. 763 (May 3, 1999), where the President, in an April 29,
1999, interview, called for a "national campaign" to attack the youth problem
only a few weeks after the incident. See also Lichtblau, supra note 21, at Al
("You have a horrific incident like the Columbine shootings, and that paints a
picture of a continuing problem that has not gone away. But people are
shocked when you try to tell them that juvenile crime is actually going down.")
(quoting Shay Bilchik, head of the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).
27. See NCSL II, supra note 13.
28. Id.
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Clearly, one proposed answer to the problem has been to point the
finger at the parents of these lawless children. Thus, in 1997 and
1998, at least fifteen states passed or amended existing civil and
criminal parental responsibility laws making parents accountable for
their children's criminal actions.29 If, in fact, the rates of juvenile
crime continue, crime researchers warn that population increases
could translate to the number of juvenile arrests more than doubling
by 2010. Arguably, the recent surge in legislative response would
then continue. 30 Thus, while some say the outlook for the next ten
years is heightened juvenile crime,31 while others refute such a pre-
diction, the "trend" of looking to punish parents of youth offenders in
the fight against juvenile crime is likely to persist so long as public
concern persists.
IlI. HISTORY OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
Holding parents responsible for juvenile delinquency is not a
new concept in state legislatures. Historically, parental liability for
the acts of minors has included both civil and criminal liability.
32
However, while all fifty states have statutes imposing some type of
vicarious tort liability on parents for damages resulting from acts of
29. See Price, supra note 10, at C7. Some of the state legislation includes:
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 664 (West 1999) (requiring parents to attend all
court hearings for their child or face charges of contempt); FLA. STAT. ch.
985.203 (Supp. 2000) (making parents liable for legal fees and costs of crimi-
nal prosecution of their child); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (1999) (increasing the
amount to $10,000 for which a parent may be liable as a result of a child's
willful or malicious acts); IDAHO CODE § 32-1301 (1999) (allowing cities to
enact and enforce parental responsibility ordinances for the offense of failure
to supervise a child, with misdemeanor penalties).
30. See NCSL II, supra note 13. But cf. 1999 NATIONAL REPORT, supra
note 12, at 134 ("As Attorney General Janet Reno has often said, demography
is not destiny.... Current and future social and policy changes will have more
effect on juvenile violent crime and arrest trends than will population
changes.").
31. See NCSL II, supra note 13 ("Demographics suggest that a swell of
children now under age 10-many of whom a prominent Princeton professor
[John J. Dilulio] recently referred to as 'fatherless, godless and jobless'--could
create yet another wave of lawlessness."); see also Gramckow & Tompkins,
supra note 15, at 1-2 ("[Heightened public] concerns were fueled by a few
criminologists who predicted a coming generation of 'superpredators' based on
the decade-long growth in serious and violent juvenile crime arrests...
32. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
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their children, 33 lawmakers are now focusing attention on harsher
criminal sanctions for parents. 34 In order to analyze this shift in the
direction of heightened criminal liability, this Part first examines past
attempts at parental responsibility.
A. Civil Liability
In 1846, Hawaii passed the first statute allowing victims to re-
cover from the parents of the child who harmed them.3 1 While the
common law did not allow recovery absent the showing of a parent's
act or omission causing damage, state statutes generally imposed
civil liability based solely on the parent-child relationship. This was
regardless of an intentional or negligent act or omission by the par-
ent.36 However, state statutes generally did address the necessary
33. See Christine T. Greenwood, Note, Holding Parents Criminally Re-
sponsible for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children: Reasoned Response or
"Knee-JerkReaction"?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 401,401 (1997).
34. See Courtney L. Zolman, Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts:
Medicine for Ailing Families and Hope for the Future, 27 CAP. U. L. REV.
217, 226 (1998).
35. See 1859 Haw. Sess. Laws. 1288 (codified as amended at HAW. REV.
STAT. § 577-3 (1999)). Hawaii's statute was unusual since, unlike other state
statutes that followed, it did not cap the potential recovery by victims of juve-
nile crime. See Jason Emilios Dimitris, Comment, Parental Responsibility
Statutes-And the Programs that Must Accompany Them, 27 STETSON L. REV.
655, 662 (1997). All state statutes, except Hawaii, now place monetary re-
strictions on recovery by victims, although these limits have been increased in
recent amendments. See Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971) (hold-
ing that Georgia's vicarious liability statute was unconstitutional since it did
not limit the amount of recovery against a parent).
36. See Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental
Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 621, 628-32 (1997). The author noted that while the common
law held "no general responsibility for the rearing of incorrigible children...
[this] limited common law liability... has been extended by statute" in all but
one state. Id. at 631. An example is Alaska's statute, amended in 1995 to in-
crease the maximum parental liability from $2000 to $10,000:
A person... may recover damages in a civil action in an amount not
to exceed $10,000 ... from either parent, both parents, or the legal
guardian of an unemancipated minor under the age of 18 years who, as
a result of a knowing or intentional act, destroys real or personal prop-
erty belonging to the person ....
ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020(a) (Michie 1999).
1726
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
state of mind of the child.37 More than mere negligence, the child
must have been "willfu.l," "malicious," "delinquent," "intentional,"
or "reckless" in causing a criminal act, depending on the require-
ments of the state statute.
38
1. Goals of civil liability statutes
Why were civil parental liability statutes historically adopted?
Authors and case law suggest that the majority of such state statutes
were enacted in response to an increase in juvenile delinquency from
1951 through the 1960s.39  During that period, many individuals
came to question the ability of the juvenile court system-trying to
act as parens patriae-to rehabilitate delinquent youth.40  "The
treatment techniques available to juvenile justice professionals never
reached the desired levels of effectiveness."
41
For this reason, states began to focus on parents as the cause of
juvenile delinquency. Thus, the goal for adopting parental liability
laws was to punish, or at least threaten to punish, parents for the acts
of their children, rationalizing that parents would then exercise con-
trol over their children.4 2 Accordingly, it was presumed that "the
threat of civil damages [would] encourage parents to better supervise
their children, and that better supervision of children [would] reduce
juvenile tortious [and criminal] acts. ' 43 Therefore, while parental
civil liability laws, like many tort laws, may also have been adopted
for the clear purpose of compensating the victim, the primary goal
was to reduce juvenile delinquency.44
37. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 632.
38. See id.
39. Seeid. at631.
40. See generally Juvenile Justice: A Century of Change, 1999 NAT'L REP.
SERIES, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1999, at 2-5 (describing the transformation of the ju-
venile justice system from its founding, where the focus was on rehabilitation,
through the 1990s, where the focus was, and continues to be, on "cracking
down" on juvenile crime).
41. Id. at 3.
42. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 633.
43. Id. at 633; see also General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d
645, 650 (N.C. 1963) (discussing this rationale behind adoption of North
Carolina's and other states' vicarious parental liability statutes).
44. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3(c) (1999) (stating that the statute's
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2. Effectiveness of civil liability statutes
Despite the adoption of parental civil liability statutes to control
juvenile delinquency, there is, at present, inadequate evidence to as-
certain whether this has in fact resulted.a It would seem that the rise
in juvenile crime rates since the enactment of these statutes would
prove the statutes to be ineffective. However, there are currently no
reliable studies to support this presumption.
46
Opponents argue that the possible inadequacies of such civil re-
sponsibility statutes derive, first, from the courts' fleeting focus on
imposing a money judgment, rather than a focus on deterring delin-
quency through responsible parenting.a7 Some parents will not be
influenced by a money judgment since they have inadequate re-
sources to compensate a victim.4 8 For others, money may not be an
issue, and they will "think nothing of paying the fine," especially
since the amounts now statutorily enforceable are fairly small.4 9 In
either situation, once judgment is entered, the court has no further in-
fluence over that parent. "Further motivation for reform must come
from within the parent, which is an unlikely outcome due to the fact
that some deficiency of the parent is most often what landed the par-
ent in court in the first place."50 Therefore, even if a victim is com-
pensated for the injury, a money judgment leaves unaddressed the
juvenile's delinquent behavior and the parent's failure to prevent
such behavior.
5 1
purpose "is to provide for the public welfare and aid in the control of juvenile
delinquency, not to provide restorative compensation to victims"); see also
Chapin, supra note 36, at 632 (noting that the primary legislative intent of pa-
rental civil liability laws is not to compensate the victims). If, in fact, this were
the main goal, "there would be no reason to statutorily restrict the recovery" as
almost all state laws presently do. Id.
45. See id. at 637.
46. While one study addressing this question suggested that civil parental
liability statutes do not result in a reduction in juvenile delinquency, this study
has been criticized as flawed in structure and analysis. See id.
47. See Zolman, supra note 34, at 232-33.
48. See id. at 232.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 233.
51. See id. (stating the author's preference for criminal liability statutes
since civil liability greatly restricts the court by preventing it from taking any
solution-oriented action).
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Second, critics argue that due to their restrictions, civil statutes
actually do not fulfill the secondary goal of compensating the vic-
tim. 52 As of 1991, about half of all state statutes failed to cover dam-
ages due to personal injury, covering only property damages.53 The
average maximum recovery amount in 1991 was only $2500 or less,
"hardly enough to cover medical expenses and out-of-pocket losses
related to the infliction of serious personal injuries. 54 In addition, as
stated by Judge Sophia Hall of the Juvenile Justice Section of Cook
County in Chicago, "We're talking about dysfunctional families, fre-
quently; and for the majority of folks coming through juvenile court,
money is the issue in the first place." 55 Therefore, while the fines are
often too small to fully compensate victims, they are also too large
for a low-income family who must now subtract those funds from
family necessities.56
Proponents of civil parental responsibility statutes suggest
maximizing liability amounts to help provide increased deterrence to
parents to better supervise their children.57 While the amounts insti-
tuted at present may not have such an effect, increased liability could
scare parents into taking action. On the other hand, as stated above,
increased liability may only result in more hardship for the low-
income families that are often the defendants in such lawsuits.
B. Criminal Liability
To adhere to criminal law principles and constitutional require-
ments, criminal sanctions cannot be imposed on a parent through a
52. See Howard Davidson, No Consequences-Re-Examining Parental Re-
sponsibility Laws, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 26 (1995-96).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Mary Wisniewski Holden, Increasing Message to Parents of Juvenile
Offenders: You're Grounded, CHI. LAw., Dec. 1996, at 14.
56. See Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Power
to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children,
44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 469 (1991) (stating that fines under these statutes are
"too small to effect a change in the behavior of parents," instead reducing the
minimal resources the parents have to provide to their families).
57. Gloria Allred, a Los Angeles trial attorney, suggests that making the
ceiling even higher would provide "a real incentive for parents so that they
think, 'Gee, I could be sued for $500,000 or $1 million dollars."' CNN Cross-
fire, supra note 7.
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theory of vicarious liability.58 Therefore, unlike civil parental liabil-
ity, criminal liability is not invoked based solely upon the parent-
child status. In order to be categorized as criminal conduct, the fol-
lowing generally must be implicated: (1) actus reus, an act or omis-
sion; (2) mens rea; (3) causation; and (4) harm.59 Statutory criminal
liability is thus imposed upon a parent where "the parent is proved to
have had the requisite criminal intent and to have 'caused' the child's
delinquent act.... [T]he connection between the parent's poor par-
enting and the child's delinquent act must be established.., unlike
[under] the vicarious tort liability statutes." 60  This translates to
criminal liability for parents only for their own actions or omissions,
and not for the delinquent acts of their child based solely on being
the parent of that child.61 Neither courts nor legislatures have said
that parents should be held criminally liable simply because they are
parents.
Criminal parental responsibility laws must also withstand con-
stitutional due process, vagueness, and overbreadth challenges, ar-
guments often raised by opponents of such laws. Without proof of
mens rea (generally established by actual or constructive knowledge
of the child's behavior) and causation (the ability to control the
child's behavior), criminal sanctions would likely not pass constitu-
tional muster.62  However, if legislators draft criminal parental
58. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 637.
59. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
119-20 (1996).
60. Chapin, supra note 36, at 638.
61. See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 39-40 (N.H. 1979) (striking down a
parental responsibility statute because it criminalized the status of parenthood
by failing to specify an act or omission by the parent that would impose crimi-
nal liability); see also Zolman, supra note 34, at 241 ("Parents are not, as some
opponents believe, at fault simply as a result of their status in relation to the
child.").
62. For example, one municipal ordinance on parental responsibility was
struck down by a court for violating parents' rights to due process of law be-
cause its language presumed that children's misconduct resulted from parents'
active or passive wrongdoing. See Doe v. City of Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding the Trenton ordinance unconstitu-
tional since the prosecution did not have to prove the parents' mens rea or the
causation element usually required for a criminal conviction), aff'dper curiam,
380 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1977); see also CAN Crossfire, supra note 7 (statement by
president of the ACLU, Nadine Strossen: "Our criminal law is appropriately
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liability statutes and ordinances with "a sufficient degree of specific-
ity," or if courts "import tort and/or criminal standards to provide the
laws with substantive content," these statutes should withstand con-
stitutional challenges grounded in vagueness. 63 Also, if legislators
carefully draft these laws to define the acts and omissions that con-
stitute violations of the provisions, the prosecution can avoid over-
breadth challenges.
64
The most common criminal liability statutes involve penalties
for "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" (CDM) or "endan-
gering the welfare" of a child. Colorado was the first state to enact
such a law in 1903.65 All but two states followed by 1961.66 Such
statutes punish anyone, including parents, who "cause" or "contrib-
ute" to a child's commission of an unlawful act.67 These laws, simi-
lar to parental abuse or neglect statutes, punish the adult for either
demanding. Before somebody can be prosecuted and deprived of liberty, he or
she has to have a specific intent, specific knowledge to participate in the crime
.... It would be tragic to treat as criminals parents who nearly [sic] were neg-
ligent or not perfect parents.").
63. Greenwood, supra note 33, at 425. In general, a constitutional discus-
sion is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more complete discussion of
the constitutionality of parental responsibility legislation, see Parsley, supra
note 56, and Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 859
(1991).
64. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 426.
65. 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
6-701 (1999)) (applying to "[a]ny person who induces, aids, or encourages a
child to violate any federal or state law, municipal or county ordinance, or
court order").
66. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 648.
67. An example is Alabama's CDM statute, ALA. CODE § 12-15-13(a)
(1999), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any parent, guardian or other person to will-
fully aid, encourage or cause any child to become or remain delin-
quent, dependent or in need of supervision or by words, acts, threats,
commands or persuasions, to induce or endeavor to induce, aid or en-
courage any child to do or perform any act or to follow any course of
conduct which would cause or manifestly tend to cause such child to
become or remain delinquent, dependent or in need of supervision or
by the neglect of any lawful duty or in any other manner contribute to
the delinquency, dependency or need of supervision of a child.
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affirmative conduct or specified omissions.68 An adult, for example,
can be punished for actively enticing a minor into stealing or using
alcohol.69 On the other hand, an adult can also be punished forfail-
ure to have a child attend school.7 ° While typically negligence
crimes, some statutes require a higher level of mens rea for certain
elements of the crime.71 In the few cases where parents, as opposed
to other unrelated adults, have been prosecuted under CDM statutes,
the courts have rarely addressed the significance of the relationship
between parenting and the child's delinquent act.
72
Despite the prevalence of CDM statutes, parental responsibility
laws arose in order to focus more on the relationship between par-
enting and a child's delinquency. 73 By 1997, about seventeen states
and numerous municipalities enacted these more specific "parental
responsibility" statutes.74 Such laws focus on the parents' liability
for their children's criminal acts, often through the separate offense
of failure to supervise a child or improper supervision-in essence,
violations of parental duties.75 Thus, parental responsibility laws
68. See S. Randall Humm, Comment, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills
as a Means to Contain Violence By and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1123, 1144 (1991).
69. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-81.1a (West Supp. 1999).
70. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-13(a).
71. See Paul W. Schmidt, Note, Dangerous Children and the Regulated
Family: The Shifting Focus of Parental Responsibility Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 667, 676-77 (1998); see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (1999)
(providing that "[a] person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child.., if
he knowingly endangers the welfare... by purposely violating a duty of care")
(emphasis added).
72. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 648.
73. This is not to suggest that clauses instituting parental responsibility are
new. For example, parental liability clauses have been included in local cur-
few ordinances since the 1950s. The difference, however, is that what are now
being referred to as "parental responsibility laws" are much broader, imposing
criminal liability against the parent for a wide range of acts by the child. See
id. at 651.
74. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 416. Examples of recently enacted
state parental responsibility statutes include: CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West
1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-1301 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-81.1a (West
Supp. 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1999); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 858.2 (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.577 (Supp.
1998); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-244 (Michie 1999).
75. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 416.
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generally punish passive, rather than active, conduct by the parent.
76
Unlike CDM statutes, parental responsibility laws often (1) lessen
the mens rea needed to establish guilt,77 or (2) specify which juvenile
acts indicate violations of parenting under the statute.78 There is a
trend in recent parental responsibility laws to combine both specific-
ity of action and lessening of mens rea requirements. 79 This would
seem to reflect a "heightened willingness to define proper parenting
and to hold parents liable for deviations from this definition."
80
1. Goals of criminal liability statutes
The primary purpose of criminal parental responsibility laws,
similar to civil liability statutes, is to decrease juvenile delinquency
through deterrence. The theory, again, is that "if parents are pun-
ished, or threatened with punishment, they will become 'good' par-
ents to avoid such punishment," thereby reducing juvenile crime.
8 1
76. According to one author, "a duty to act can be created with liability re-
sulting from nonperformance .... The state imposes an affirmative duty on
the parent to provide guidance, which if ignored leads to criminal sanctions."
Humm, supra note 68, at 1145.
77. See Schmidt, supra note 71, at 679. For example, OR. REV. STAT. §
163.577 imposes strict liability for:
Failing to supervise a child.
(1) A person commits the offense of failing to supervise a child if the
person is the parent.., charged with the care or custody of a child un-
der 15 years of age and the child:
(a) Commits an act that brings the child within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court ....
Id.
78. See Schmidt, supra note 71, at 678-79. For example, Louisiana's stat-
ute makes parents criminally liable if a child is convicted of a felony; is a
member of a known criminal street gang; possesses or has access to an illegal
firearm, weapon, or explosive; is a known user or distributor of illegal drugs;
or is habitually truant. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:92.2 (West Supp. 2000).
Criminal sanctions include penalties of between $25 and $250 per offense, im-
prisonment for up to 30 days, or both. See id. The mens rea is set at criminal
negligence, defined by the Louisiana legislature as a "gross deviation below
the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man
under like circumstances." Id. § 14:12. Several states have also enacted laws
dealing specifically with guns, punishing parents whose children illegally pos-
sess or use firearms. See discussion infra Part V.
79. See Schmidt, supra note 71, at 681-82.
80. Id. at 682.
81. Chapin, supra note 36, at 650.
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Since convictions under such statutes are rare, some commentators
have suggested that parental responsibility laws are on the books
primarily for this threat of punishment, to encourage parents to con-
trol their children, rather than as a source of true punishment.
82
2. Effectiveness of criminal liability statutes
The lingering question is whether criminal parental liability can
or will reduce juvenile delinquency by punishing or threatening to
punish the parent. At the present time, states do not have evidence of
the effectiveness of existing criminal liability legislation. 83 In fact,
"there is no study which has been discovered which has even at-
tempted the ... task of assessing whether such criminal statutes do,
in fact, result in a change in the parent's behavior which in turn re-
sults in a reduction in delinquent acts by his or her child.' 84 There is
only anecdotal evidence to rely upon to show that "parental respon-
sibility policies or ordinances have the positive deterrent effect of
encouraging parents to exercise more responsible control over way-
ward children before they begin to engage in delinquent conduct."
85
The effectiveness of existing laws is unknown, in large part, be-
cause of a lack of actual enforcement of parental liability through the
legal system.86 In theory, it would certainly seem that deterrence
would only work if, in fact, there was a true threat that the law would
actually be enforced.87 One author suggests that CDM statutes are
generally not enforced because the actions are classified as misde-
meanors, thereby "diminishing police and prosecutor interest in pur-
suing actions under them."88 He recommends that before dismissing
82. See id. at 653.
83. See id. at 654.
84. Id.
85. Davidson, supra note 52, at 27.
86. See id. at 25-26.
87. According to one author, low prosecution rates indicate the failure of
criminal parental liability laws because this diminishes fear and thus dimin-
ishes the law's deterrent effects on parents. See Michelle L. Casgrain, Note,
Parental Responsibility Laws: Cure for Crime or Exercise in Futility?, 37
WAYNE L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1990).
88. Davidson, supra note 52, at 25. He also suggests that CDM statutes are
not enforced because of concern over their constitutionality. See id. However,
he recognizes that most of these statutes focus on specific behavior, "sidestep-
ping such constitutional concerns as due process infringements, 'void for
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CDM statutes as ineffective and unfair, research should be done to
study recent amendments upgrading violations to felonies. 89 "Only
by comparing the use of... CDM laws before the change as con-
trasted with after the change will states know if the new legislative
initiatives are accomplishing their intended purposes."9 Similarly,
parental responsibility laws, like CDM statutes, possibly are not en-
forced by prosecutors at the present time because of the minor pen-
alties imposed.91 If this is true, amendments imposing harsher pen-
alties may result in some increase in prosecutions, thereby permitting
such a study in the future on the effectiveness of stricter laws on the
ultimate goal of reducing juvenile crime.
92
Another reason for the lack of enforcement is the difficulty in
proving the mens rea required in many statutes. 93 The low utilization
of criminal parental liability laws "may be attributable to the diffi-
culty inherent in proving parental knowledge in states which require
some act or omission of the parent," rather than to law enforcement's
failure to bring charges. 94 Critics also argue that for some criminal
laws, the necessary mens rea is often too vague to enforce.9 5 One
commentator suggests that the key to a successful parental responsi-
bility statute is its clarity, since only then can courts effectively de-
termine if a parent falls within the standard of the law.96 Similarly,
causation issues arise since in many circumstances the prosecution
cannot state with certainty whether a parent's failure to control his or
her child actually caused the juvenile delinquency at hand.
97
vagueness,' and status crimes." Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999) (enforcing crime as
misdemeanor).
92. See discussion infra Part V for examples of such statutes.
93. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1046 n.167. Implicit in this lack of en-
forcement is the fact that the effectiveness of parental responsibility laws sim-
ply has not been tested.
94. Id.
95. See discussion infra Part III.C, concerning California's Penal Code
section 272, where opponents of the law made this argument.
96. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 424-25.
97. See supra Part I for discussion of the many identified causes attribut-
able to juvenile delinquency, thereby making it difficult to say bad parenting
was the cause. See also Doe v. City of Trenton, where the court reiterated that
research and analysis tend "to support the conclusion that parental actions are
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Where will the new trend of parental responsibility laws take
us? Is the answer more enforcement? In other words, is the answer
pursuing more punishment? Analysis of California's parental re-
sponsibility statute may help to answer some of these questions.
C. California 's Penal Code Section 272
California's Penal Code section 272 has served as a model for
many recent parental responsibility statutes. While the statute origi-
nally penalized only the offense of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor, the legislature added an amendment including a parental re-
sponsibility provision in 1988. 98 It reads: "For purposes of this sec-
tion, a parent or legal guardian to any person under the age of 18
years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision,
protection, and control over their [sic] minor child."99 Section 272
was amended at the request of Los Angeles prosecutorial agencies to
target parents for "the express purpose of deterring juvenile delin-
quency, particularly juvenile gang activity, by affecting parental ac-
tions perceived to cause such delinquency."'100 The criminal parental
responsibility provision imposes a fine, not to exceed $2500, impris-
onment of no more than one year, or both for parental violations.
0 l
but a single factor in the interaction of forces producing juvenile misconduct."
Doe, 362 A.2d at 1203. The court concluded that it could not state with sub-
stantial assurance that a minor's second public peace adjudication was "more
likely than not" the result of active or passive wrongdoing by the parents in the
case. Id.
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999). The original California
CDM statute was not used to correct parental inadequacies, and thereby reduce
juvenile crime, but was instead only applied to punish adults in general for
their misconduct. Section 272 was thus clearly targeted at parents. See Ray-
mond F. Vincent, Expanding the Neglected Role of the Parent in the Juvenile
Court, 4 PEPP. L. REv. 523, 531 (1977).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (emphasis added).
100. Chapin, supra note 36, at 655. The amendment was enacted as part of
the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 1988 Cal. Stat. 1242,
1256 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20-.28 (West 1999)),
on the premise that California was in a state of crisis caused by violent street
gangs, and that parents needed to be enlisted as active participants in the effort
to eradicate such gangs. See Sharon A. Ligorsky, Note, Williams v. Garcetti:
Constitutional Defects in California's "Gang-Parent" Liability Statute, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 447,448-49 (1994).
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272.
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Unlike most parental liability statutes or ordinances, section
272's constitutionality was thrust into the spotlight in Williams v.
Garcetti'0 2 shortly after its enactment. The California Supreme
Court upheld the amended statute in its entirety, finding that it was
neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. 10 3 The court also
held that section 272 did not interfere with parents' constitutional
rights to raise and educate their children or to enjoy privacy in their
family lives. 10 4 According to the court, parents were provided suffi-
cient notice of potential liability for failure to supervise and control
their children. 10 5 Additionally, the court found that the parental duty
was sufficiently certain, despite the fact that neither the amendment
nor prior case law set forth specific acts that a parent would have to
perform, or avoid, to fulfill their duties of supervision and control.1
0 6
The court reasoned that a statutory definition of "perfect parenting"
would be "inflexible and not necessary to identify the egregious
breaches of parental duty that come within the statute's purview.
' 0 7
Instead, the court saw the concept of "reasonableness" as a guide for
parents. Therefore, according to the court, criminal liability would
be imposed under the statute only when a parent engaged in conduct
that so grossly departed from this "reasonableness" standard of care
as to amount to criminal negligence. 108 The court noted that the
102. 5 Cal. 4th 561, 853 P.2d 507, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993). California's
state supreme court is, in fact, the only court to actually analyze the constitu-
tionality of a parental criminal liability statute.
103. See id. at 577-79, 853 P.2d at 516-17, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-51.
104. See id. at 578, 853 P.2d at 516-17, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-51.
105. The court stated that because section 272 "incorporates the definition
and the limits of a parental duty to supervise and control children that has long
been a part of California [dependency law and] tort law," parents had adequate
notice. Id. at 575, 853 P.2d at 514, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
106. See id. at 572, 853 P.2d at 512, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346. The court
agreed with defendant's argument that the statute, in fact, had to lack specific-
ity since "it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive statutory defini-
tion of reasonable supervision and control." Id. at 573, 853 P.2d at 513, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 573-74, 853 P.2d at 513, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347. The court
defined criminal negligence as "'aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that
is,... such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily pru-
dent or careful [person] under the same circumstances."' Id. at 574, 853 P.2d
at 513, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (quoting People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 861, 879,
285 P.2d 926, 937 (1955)).
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heightened requirements of criminal negligence insist on actual or
constructive knowledge by the parents of a risk of delinquent acts by
their child.'I 9
Despite the seemingly broad terminology constituting a viola-
tion under section 272, the court clearly narrowed the reach of the
statute by distinctly defining the parents that it would affect, as noted
above.110 The court even further narrowed the statute's influence by
pointing out that even if section 272 did apply to a particular parent,
there were alternatives to imposing the statutory penalties."' As a
part of the bill including this amendment, the probation department
could recommend diversion of parents to parenting classes under
specific circumstances. 2 If parents completed a program prior to
trial, all criminal charges would be dismissed."13 The court, there-
fore, recognized that this opportunity for parental diversion from
criminal prosecution in less egregious cases "suggests that as a prac-
tical matter a parent will face criminal penalties ...only in those
cases in which the parent's culpability is great and the causal con-
nection correspondingly clear."
114
As a result of this alternative of diversion and its reinforcement
by the Williams court, and despite the apparent desire in section 272
to hold parents criminally liable, deficient parenting that falls within
the statute is hardly ever enforced with criminal sanctions. While the
threat behind section 272 is criminal prosecution, enforcement is
109. See id. at 574, 853 P.2d at 513-14, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347-48. Thus, the
court made clear that section 272 punishes only parents who know or reasona-
bly should know that their child is at risk of delinquency. Also, it appears that
parents who take reasonable steps to control their child and are not successful
will not be charged under section 272. See id., 853 P.2d at 514, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 348.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 566, 853 P.2d at 508, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
112. See id.
113. The first use of section 272 involved the arrest of Gloria Williams, the
mother of a fifteen-year-old rape suspect. Police found gang insignia, includ-
ing bedroom walls covered in graffiti and photograph albums showing mem-
bers of the family pointing guns. When it was learned that Williams had at-
tended parenting classes before she was arrested, the charges against her for
violation of section 272 were dropped. See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 859-
60.
114. Williams, 5 Cal. 4th at 576, 853 P.2d at 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349
(emphasis added).
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generally obtained through parenting classes and counseling.
115
Section 272 thus distinctly illustrates the "tension between society's
desire to blame parents for the juvenile delinquency of their children,
and society's reluctance to actually punish them" with criminal
sanctions.116
Despite the lack of criminal enforcement of section 272, Cali-
fornia's actions do illustrate a willingness to point the finger at par-
ents for delinquency problems of their children. The state instead re-
quires the affirmative action of parental training, as opposed to
punishment, in appropriate circumstances to remedy the problem.
1 17
The use of section 272's diversion program in fact confirms "a new
rationale for parental liability statutes [that] is being tested in Cali-
fornia: if lack of adequate parental control and supervision is a pri-
mary cause of juvenile delinquency..., then perhaps parent train-
ing, not parent punishment, will provide the much desired deterrent
effect."
1 18
IV. THE EXTREME CASES: COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL AND
SIMILAR SCHOOL SHOOTINGS
Controversy over the goals and anticipated effects of parental
responsibility laws would seem to explain the reported fear of tap-
ping into the potential uses of these statutes. Clearly, existing pa-
rental responsibility laws have been used primarily, if at all, for pre-
vention rather than punishment. Where there have been
prosecutions, parents generally have been ordered to pay a small fine
or attend parenting classes, as illustrated by enforcement of
115. A 1995 report indicated that in 1994, the Los Angeles City Attorney's
Gang Unit sent "one thousand parents to counseling or classes (presumably
under the threat of possible prosecution); only two parents who refused to co-
operate with the Unit were actually prosecuted" under section 272. See David-
son, supra note 52, at 27.
116. Chapin, supra note 36, at 625.
117. See id. at 660.
118. Id.
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California Penal Code section 272.119 Cases where considerable
criminal sanctions have been applied are virtually unheard of to date.
This lack of enforcement is illustrated by the vast publicity re-
sulting from one of the few prosecutions under a parental responsi-
bility ordinance in 1996 in St. Clair Shores, Michigan.121 The ordi-
nance required parents to exercise "reasonable control" in preventing
their children from committing delinquent acts.12' Robert Ihrie,
author of the ordinance, defended its purpose and reach: "Parents are
held responsible for their own conduct under our ordinance.... If
parents exercise even the most minimal parental supervision, it is
unlikely [that] they would ever be charged with an ordinance viola-
tion.''122 A jury deliberated for less than fifteen minutes before con-
victing Anthony and Susan Provenzino under this ordinance for
failing to control their child. 123 The couple's son had committed
seven burglaries, and the couple was on notice of the town ordi-
nance. 24 Jurors later said that their decision to convict was based
119. Other states also now provide affirmative opportunities, such as par-
enting classes, reporting the child's crime, and community service to preclude
criminal punishment. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1044; see also OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.577(7)(a) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added):
If a person pleads guilty or is found guilty of failing to supervise a
child... and if the person has only one prior conviction for failing to
supervise a child, the court... may suspend imposition of sentence
and order the person to complete a parent effectiveness program ap-
proved by the court.
120. For a complete discussion of the facts of the case, see Barry Siegel,
Town Tries to Police the Parents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996, at Al [hereinaf-
ter Siegel I].
121. ST. CLAIR SHORES, MICH., PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY ORDINANCE
20.561-20.566 (1994) (requiring parents "to exercise reasonable control to pre-
vent the minor from committing any delinquent act"); see also Barry Siegel, 2
Held Accountable for Son's Burglaries, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at Al
[hereinafter Siegel II] (discussing application of the ordinance).
122. Zolman, supra note 34, at 236 (quoting Are Parents Responsible for
Their Children s Crimes?, Online NewsHour: Parental Responsibility Forum,
(May 21, 1996) <http://www/pbs.org/newshour/forum/may96/parents_5-
21.html>).
123. See Siegel I, supra note 120, at Al.
124. See id. The parents were first confronted by the police in May 1995,
after their son had committed three break-ins; they were warned at that time
about the town's liability ordinance. Detectives later found marijuana plants, a
stolen .25-caliber gun on the night stand, and several other stolen items in plain
view in the boy's bedroom. See id.
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largely on the Provenzinos' failure either to get their son into coun-
seling or to take action after the warnings.12 5 They were fined $100
each, assessed $1000 in court fees, and ordered to pay their son's
detention costs, totaling $13,000 a year for care in a youth home.
126
Reaction to the highly publicized plight of the Provenzinos was
mixed. National sentiments reflected both feelings of unfairness and
feelings of justice.127 However, according to local reports, "it [was]
hard to find anyone in St. Clair Shores inclined to defend the Pro-
venzinos. ' 128 Many felt that this was "the right case to use as a test
... [and] the right time" to do so.'
2 9
Reaction to the recent onslaught of violent school shootings,
primarily the Columbine High School shooting, seems to parallel the
reaction to St. Clair Shores. We have seen an increased societal
"quest to blame someone or something for these inexplicable ram-
pages [that] does not stop with the youthful perpetrators."'130 People
are pointing fingers at parents, and the debate over the appropriate-
ness of parental liability is on the tips of everybody's tongues. Ac-
cording to the National Conference of State Legislatures' spokes-
man, Gene Ross, the Columbine incident "definitely heightened
awareness" of parental liability laws; he anticipates that as a result
"many such measures likely will be introduced in state legislatures"
in the next year.13 1 Therefore, while parental responsibility
125. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1030.
126. See id. However, the parents appealed the fines, which were overturned
for the prosecution's failure to show that the Provenzinos did not, in fact, at-
tempt to bring their son to counseling. See id. at 1030 & n.19 (citing City of
St. Clair Shores v. Provenzino, No. 96-1483 AR, at 15 (County of Macomb,
Mich., Cir. Ct., July 16, 1997)). The court also struck down a section of the
ordinance that created parental liability based solely on the child's delinquent
status. See id.
127. People across the country reacted to the case over the Internet. Some
parents felt that the Provenzinos were rightfully punished for their lack of con-
trol over their son and that this ordinance was properly applied as an attack on
juvenile crime. Opponents felt sympathy for the Provenzinos' inability to
control their son. They felt that the ordinance invaded the privacy of parent-
ing. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1031-32.
128. Siegel I, supra note 120, at Al.
129. Id.
130. DelCour, supra note 1.
131. Price, supra note 10, at C7.
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prosecution remains fairly dormant to date, the Columbine incident is
proving itself to be the extreme case that may change things.
Shortly after the shootings at Columbine High School on April
20, 1999, news reporters, law professors, legislators, and President
Clinton were all talking about whether the parents of shooters, Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold, were to blame. The public heard over and
over the lists of evidence that arguably would have put reasonable
parents on notice for risks of criminal action by their child.1 32 Attor-
ney General Janet Reno and Governor Bill Owens of Colorado re-
acted by suggesting shortly after the massacre that if the parents had
any hint of the plan and failed to act, the parents might be criminally
liable for such an omission.
1 33
Legal experts reacted by debating whether this was in fact a le-
gal problem or a moral matter. According to Marin Belsky, dean of
the University of Tulsa College of Law, "You can't resolve every-
thing by law,.., and that's spoken by the dean of a law school.'
134
On the other side, according to Los Angeles trial attorney, Gloria
Allred, "The reason [this needs to be a legal issue] is because many
parents are not controlling their children, and this is really sending a
message to parents, 'Look, you have them under your care ... and
you need to exercise that control."",135 Colorado officials responded
by announcing that they were denying immunity to the parents of
Eric Harris, leaving open the possibility of future prosecution136
The Schoel family, whose son was killed at Columbine, filed a $250
million wrongful death lawsuit on May 28, 1999, against the Harris
and Klebold parents. 137 Finally, the Columbine incident triggered
132. Police found a sawed-off shotgun, bomb-making materials, and hate lit-
erature in full view in Eric's and Dylan's bedrooms; neighbors heard sounds of
them shattering glass to make pipe bombs in the garage; a journal was found
showing that the shootings had been planned for a year. See CNN Crossfire,
supra note 7; see also DelCour, supra note 1 ("[W]e ask, how could you be so
clueless? How could parents have not asked, 'Hey, I hear you out in the ga-
rage cutting up pipe with a hacksaw. What's that all about?').
133. See William Glaberson, Parental Culpability Dubious, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Apr. 27, 1999, at A4.
134. DelCour, supra note 1.
135. CNN Crossfire, supra note 7.
136. See Price, supra note 10, at C7.
137. See Dave Cullen, Let the Litigation Begin (last modified May 28, 1999)
<http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/05/28/families/index.html>. The
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reaction at the national level-only three weeks later, President
Clinton sent Congress a bill mandating prison sentences of three to
ten years with a $10,000 fine for adults, including parents, who
"knowingly or recklessly" allow children access to guns.138 While
there is mixed reaction, as with any parental liability law, some peo-
ple who ordinarily oppose criminal sanctions on parents seem to be
crossing the line, seeing merit in this bill as a response to incidents
like Columbine.
39
V. THE YOUTH GuN CRIME ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1999:
AN APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY RESPONSE FOR EXTREME CASES?
There has been a large increase recently in laws holding parents
criminally responsible for leaving unsecured firearms or ammunition
in the home, where children can gain easy access to them. 140 Usu-
ally, these laws require that the parent either: (1) knowingly or
recklessly provide a minor child with access to a gun, or (2) know
that the child has the gun, regardless of the source, but fail to act on
it.14  Unlike the broad parental responsibility statutes discussed in
Part II.B, which are almost always punishable as misdemeanors,
handgun statutes are often classified as felonies.
142
lawsuit accuses the parents of being negligent in their duties and responsibili-
ties of parental supervision and contends that "by omission and inaction they
facilitated the actions of their sons." Columbine Victim 's Kin File Lawsuit,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 28, 1999, at 11.
138. See Price, supra note 10, at C7.
139. Mark Soler, president of the Youth Law Center in Washington, D.C.,
for example, stated that while he had "real concerns about.., imposing impos-
sible standards on parents," he saw merit in the proposal to make parents
criminally liable for knowingly or recklessly giving their children access to
guns. Id.
140. In 1990, Florida was among the first states to make such parental con-
duct a serious offense, instituting a five-year prison sentence and a $5000 fine
against parents whose children use guns that have been left unsecured. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05(3) (West Supp. 2000); Dimitris, supra note 35, at
669. Other states have recently followed Florida's lead. See, e.g., NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1204.01 (Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-15 (West
1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.16 (McKinney 2000).
141. See Schmidt, supra note 71, at 680-81.
142. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05(3) (making the crime a felony of the
third degree); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1204.01 (making the crime a Class
IV felony).
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President Clinton's gun-control proposal appears in Senate Bill
995 and House Bill 1768.143 The national legislation mirrors many
of these state actions by holding parents criminally liable whenever
they "knowingly or recklessly" give a child access to a firearm. 144 If
the child then uses the gun to cause death or serious bodily injury to
himself or others, the parent "shall be imprisoned not more than 3
years, fined. . . , or both."'145 It is important to note that the section
of the bill discussed in this Comment is certainly not the most de-
bated, and therefore is not necessarily what is preventing passage of
this bill and revised similar bills. The bill also proposes to impose
new background check restrictions on weapons sales by dealers at
gun shows, outlaw the import of ammunition clips, and require child
safety locks on all new handguns.
146
One author suggested of the many state firearm statutes being
passed that there would be little criticism of such laws punishing
parents, given the risks inherent in providing children access to
guns. 147 The federal and state statutes also require high mens rea,
generally "knowledge" or "recklessness," for parents to come within
the purview of the law, thereby reducing the risk that faultless par-
ents will be punished-an argument made by most opponents of
lower mens rea statutes. 148 However, broad support has not fol-
lowed. While the voices of supporters have clearly been heard, 149 so
have some voices of those frustrated with the legal approach to this
problem.15 0 People at both ends of the gun-control debate feel that
143. Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, S. 995, 106th Cong. § 204;
Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 1768, 106th Cong. § 204.
See Appendix for full text of the bill.
144. See id. The adult would have to: (1) keep a firearm within his or her
control; (2) know or recklessly disregard the risk that the child can access the
gun; (3) know or recklessly disregard the risk that the child will use the firearm
to cause injury. See id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Dimitris, supra note 35, at 669.
148. See CNN Crossfire, supra note 7.
149. See id. ("If... a parent knows that his or her child has a gun and/or a
bomb, and fails to report it to authorities, or fails to take that gun away, then I
think maybe they should be treated as a criminal, because they're presenting a
risk of harm to other children.") (quoting trial attorney, Gloria Allred).
150. See id. ("The real world is that these tragic inexplicable cases of chil-
dren killing children are not legal problems.") (quoting Nadine Strossen, Presi-
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this is just another gun-control provision that would not have made a
difference. One representative opponent of such a national bill in
general argues: "The whole gun control debate is on the fringe of the
problem. You can't pretend by plugging loopholes here and there
that you're going to have an effect on the crux of American gun vio-
lence." 151 Another opponent reiterates the problem of lack of en-
forcement of these laws: "Not only would the provisions being dis-
cussed do nothing to prevent those shootings, neither do the
thousands of gun laws on the books today."
1 52
So what is the solution? Is the parental responsibility provision
in the Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999 just symbolic
lawmaking for the sake of a statement, or will it be enacted as an at-
tempt to reduce crime rates? Is this law only a political response to
recent high-profile juvenile crimes? While the national bill and state
laws at hand may not have prevented past school shootings, they are
clearly a response. Proper parental liability legislation plus enforce-
ment techniques may provide a better chance for these new laws to
chip away at the juvenile crime/parenting problem with which this
nation is faced.
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
LEGISLATION VERSUS WHAT IT SHOULD BE
It is important to note that when President Clinton proposed the
juvenile crime bill, he also recommended a national campaign to
mobilize all things affecting juvenile crime, not just parents. Ac-
cording to the president, the proper solution is one that "doesn't pre-
tend that guns are the issue, that culture is the whole issue, that par-
ents are the whole issue, that school safety is the whole issue, but
deals with all of this together."'153 As mentioned earlier, inadequate
parenting is clearly not the only cause of juvenile delinquency.
Therefore, any solution to the problem of parenting cannot operate in
a vacuum. Parental responsibility laws must be accompanied by
dent of the American Civil Liberties Union).
151. David B. Ottaway & Barbara Vobejda, Gun Control's Limited Aim,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at A01 (quoting Kristen Rand, director of federal
policy at the Violence Policy Center, a gun control advocacy group).
152. Id. (quoting John Velleco, spokesman for Gun Owners of America).
153. Interview with Katie Couric of the National Broadcasting Corporation,
35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 763, 765 (May 3, 1999).
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much farther-reaching programs to influence the many causes of de-
linquent behavior. 154  However, parental responsibility legislation
can and should be apart of the solution.
A. What is the Future of Parental Responsibility Laws?
The newer and tougher laws, imposing greater parental civil and
criminal liability, are only in the first stages of enactment and en-
forcement. 15 5 While it is still too soon to evaluate any long-term ef-
fectiveness, some results from parental responsibility enforcement
are apparent.1 56 For example, many states have adopted their paren-
tal liability statutes to follow the lead of localities with such legisla-
tion.' 5 7 Oregon passed a law in 1995 because of the purported suc-
cess of a similar ordinance passed by the small town of Silverton,
Oregon.158 Authorities in Silverton reported that crime dropped forty
percent after their parental liability law was enacted.159 Also, there
were clear results from the St. Clair Shores ordinance discussed in
Part IV. According to a report made shortly after the prosecution of
the Provenzinos: "[It appears St. Clair Shores parents are already
thinking twice about how they deal with their children. Just last
week, two parents filed police reports on their sons, one for
154. See Ligorsky, supra note 100, at 466 & n.147 (stating that the many
causes include "social class, educational level, urbanization, living conditions,
and social instability," as well as parenting).
155. See supra notes 29, 140 and accompanying text.
156. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1045.
157. See Price, supra note 10, at C7.
158. See id.
159. See id. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence to indicate
causation, as opposed to mere correlation, from these statistics. There may
have been other factors, beyond enactment of the statute, that caused the drop
in crime. For example, the national decline in juvenile crime is attributed to "a
combination of factors .... including a booming economy that provides more
jobs for youths, tougher gun control measures such as trigger lock mandates,
and increased attention to juvenile delinquency." Lichtblau, supra note 21, at
Al. See also Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three Strikes"
Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime?: An Analysis of the California
Attorney General's Report, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 101, 110 (1998) ("Many
factors influence the crime rate, making it difficult to isolate the impact of any
one."). This article further analyzes the problem of attributing causation,
rather than mere correlation, in the context of the claim that California's
"Three Strikes" legislation caused the recent decline in crime.
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possessing cigarettes, another for climbing out his bedroom window
at 11 p.m."
160
On the other hand, in California, since the enactment of section
272 and its diversion program, in spite of enrollment in parenting
classes, as of 1995 there had been no corresponding decrease in ju-
venile crime. 161 Despite both positive and negative reaction from pa-
rental responsibility legislation, the "true worth and potential [of
such laws] cannot be realized until juvenile courts [and prosecutors]
take the initiative" and begin to administer them more frequently.
62
Only then can a more universal application of these laws be studied,
rather than in the above isolated cases.
B. Recommendations for Existing and Future Laws
While universal application of existing laws will be helpful in
providing more data to analyze, this is not the sole answer. Reform-
ing and refocusing existing legislation would also aid in achieving
the ultimate goal of parental responsibility-decreased juvenile de-
linquency through stronger family structure-by alleviating some of
the problems brought about by the present laws. The following rec-
ommendations are certainly not radical, and in fact are clearly sup-
ported by many commentators.
1. The goal
First and foremost, the goal of parental responsibility laws
should be to balance prevention with prosecution. 63 This means
that laws, in appropriate cases, need to be enforced through punish-
ment, rather than just serving as threats or symbolic legislation.
"[T]he legal system needs tools to enforce parental responsibility for
children's serious public misbehavior."
164
Where the requisite intent or causation is not clearly established,
parenting classes or other social programs may be appropriate.
160. Siegel I, supra note 120, at Al.
161. See Scarola, supra note 2, at 1045.
162. Zolman, supra note 34, at 234.
163. See NCSL II, supra note 13. This is the present OJJDP comprehensive
strategy that states are following in the adoption of programs for juveniles.
164. Greenwood, supra note 33, at 433 (suggesting that parental responsibil-
ity laws should be enforced through proper use and publicized to complement
social agency activities providing services to parents).
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Parents can also be made aware of and educated about these laws
early on, before their child actually engages in the conduct. 165 How-
ever, for more serious violations-where higher mens rea and causa-
tion are met, equating to more egregious bad parenting-more seri-
ous action should be taken. Arguably by applying either prevention
or punishment, each in the appropriate circumstances, deterrence and
thus a decrease in the juvenile crime rate will more likely result.1
66
2. Social programs
Legislation for "parental offenders" should mimic that for juve-
nile offenders. For example, recent legislation for juveniles operates
on the same sliding-scale theory recommended here. 167 For first-
time or less serious juvenile offenders, laws provide for community
sanctions, aimed at risk reduction and skill development. 168 On the
other hand, for more serious or repeat offenders, more punitive and
restrictive sanctions are imposed, including secure confinement for
the most violent juveniles.1 69 Similarly, for parental offenders, leg-
islation should offer social programs for the less serious offenders or
first-time offenders, but impose criminal sanctions on the more seri-
ous offenders.
Criminal sanctions can become more effective by developing
and implementing social programs to help parents foster more ade-
quate parenting skills. 170 According to one commentator, who ex-
presses the opinion of many, "such legal accountability is realistic
and fair only when appropriate, affordable, and abundant family-
supportive and rehabilitative resources are available to families."'
171
165. See Dimitris, supra note 35, at 673.
166. See id. at 696-98.
167. See NCSL II, supra note 13.
168. See id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 (West 1996) (bal-
ancing prevention with prosecution of serious juvenile offenders); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 51.01 (West 1998) (toughening sentencing for some juvenile of-
fenders while establishing first-offender programs and seven-step progressive
sanctions for others).
169. See 1999 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 108.
170. See Dimitris, supra note 35, at 682.
171. Davidson, supra note 52, at 28; see also Dimitris, supra note 35, at 673
("Parental responsibility statutes are merely one weapon in the arsenal to attack
juvenile crime, but parental responsibility statutes will fail without supportive
social systems.").
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"Get tough laws" toward parents will not work to curb juvenile de-
linquency and violence in a vacuum.1
72
The California diversion program, offering parenting classes, is
one such example of a support program that can work in conjunction
with criminal sanctions. California has adopted the rationale that
some parents are not choosing to be bad parents, but simply are not
properly trained to be good parents. 173 A 1988 article suggests that
parenting classes may be effective in the long run in reducing juve-
nile delinquency by beginning with education. 174 Studies of pro-
grams designed for the delinquent juveniles, rather than the parents,
seem to support this suggestion. For example, an examination of
more than four hundred juvenile programs showed that the most suc-
cessful ones provided behavior training or modification, focusing on
improving interpersonal relation skills, self-control, and school
achievement. 175 Accordingly, since parenting classes would provide
adults with behavioral training and modification skills for dealing
with their children, the same result might occur with parents.
Another approach is to institute mandatory programs to get par-
ents more involved in the punishments and delinquency proceedings
of their child. Parents could be required to accompany their children
to court, participate in their children's treatment programs, and pay
for their children's criminal acts. 176 In conclusion, this method of
balanced justice for the parent and child would bring about conse-
quences and treatment for both parties, as well as increased parental
responsibility for the upbringing of children.
3. Tailored laws
Parental responsibility laws should also clearly enumerate the
conduct at which they are aimed. Only by clearly defining violations
of the statute can the law properly guide and deter parents. 177 Such
172. See Dimitris, supra note 35, at 673.
173. See Chapin, supra note 36, at 663.
174. See id. at 671.
175. See NCSL II, supra note 13 (noting that these seemed to also be the
most intensive in terms of the amount and duration of concentrated attention to
youths).
176. See the proposed statutes in supra note 29 for examples of states that
plan to institute such programs.
177. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 425.
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laws will also avoid challenges on constitutional grounds for vague-
ness, overbreadth, and due process infringements.
178
The parental responsibility provision in the Youth Gun Crime
Enforcement Act of 1999 is an example of the way parental liability
laws should be tailored.179 The provision distinctly defines the type
of action or nonaction encompassed in the law-if a parent "know-
ingly or recklessly" allows a child access to a firearm, and the child
uses that firearm to injure someone, the parent falls within the stat-
ute.180 The provision also spells out affirmative defenses to the law
that might arise, eliminating the criminal sanctions that a court would
normally impose.181 The provision is very clear as to its reach,'
82
thereby avoiding overbreadth issues, and as to the sanctions courts
can impose, 183 thereby avoiding too much sentencing discretion in
the hands of judges.
4. Punishment as a last resort
Finally, prosecution and criminal sanctions should be a last re-
sort. State and national legislation should not impose punishment
where alternative recommendations provide adequate solutions. Ac-
cording to one commentator, "It is simply inappropriate to rush into
legislative solutions that punish parents.., without ensuring that ef-
fective services are readily available to families at all income levels,
and in all parts of a state, to help them be better parents."'
184
178. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
179. See Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, S. 995, 106th Cong. §
204; Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 1768, 106th Cong. §
204. See Appendix for full text of the bill.
180. See id.
181. See id. The exceptions include: (1) if the child obtained access while
the firearm was secured; (2) if the parent or adult is a peace officer, or member
of the Armed Forces, and the child obtains the gun during or incident to per-
formance of official duties; (3) if the child uses the gun in self-defense; (4) if
the parent or adult has no reasonable expectation that a child will be on the
premises. See id.
182. See id. (stating that a "child" is any individual who has not yet attained
the age of 18, and the bill applies to adults).
183. See id. (stating that the person shall be imprisoned for not more than
three years, fined, or both).
184. Davidson, supra note 52, at 28.
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Only parents who have not taken advantage of the resources of-
fered to them or parents who are serious offenders should be subject
to prosecution and hence criminal penalties.1 85 Again, for parents
who clearly fall within the purview of the law-meaning they equate
to serious offenders because of the high mens rea and causation re-
quirements-or for parents who refuse to change, it is fair and possi-
bly necessary to impose liability. "[A] parent has a duty and oppor-
tunity to control, supervise, and train his/her child in the way of
responsible behavior."'186 If the parent and child fall short of this,
both should be punished accordingly.
While there is a trend toward tougher parental liability laws, we
see a similar trend toward tougher juvenile justice laws.1 87 For ex-
ample, within the past decade, many states have adopted mandatory
sentencing schemes or developed strict sentencing guidelines for ju-
venile offenders.1 88 In fact, ninety percent of laws concerning juve-
niles have been revised since 1990 to amend the purpose clauses or
mission statements in their juvenile codes, "in response to the belief
that serious and violent juvenile offenders must be held more ac-
countable for their actions." 189 Whereas many clauses previously fo-
cused on juveniles' emotional well-being and care, thirty-two of the
fifty states now have clauses focusing on a mixture of punishment
and prevention.' 90 Tougher actions against parental offenders should
185. See Dimitris, supra note 35, at 698.
186. Curry v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 180, 189, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
495, 500-01 (1993).
187. See NCSL I, supra note 6.
188. See Gramckow & Tompkins, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that one-third
of all juvenile court sentencing schemes now include mandatory sentencing).
189. Id.
190. See id. (noting that nine states now focus exclusively on punishment).
This, of course, assumes that the recent trend in juvenile justice reform will
prove to be effective. There are some preliminary studies to the contrary, sug-
gesting higher recidivism rates and a greater number ofjuveniles being tried as
adults. For example, in Florida, discretion has been placed in the prosecutors'
hands, instead of judges', to try juveniles as adults. As a result, in 1995, Flor-
ida prosecutors sent nearly as many juveniles to adult court as did the entire
nation's judges. See Gary Fields, Report Critical of Prosecutors' Power Over
Youths, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1999, at 3A. A study of Florida's juvenile re-
forms from 1981 through 1998 found that youths tried as adults then commit-
ted new crimes twice as fast after their release as those handled in the juvenile
system. See id. It is questionable, however, whether Florida was advancing
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continue to parallel this change with youth offenders in order to truly
obtain a successful restorative, or balanced, juvenile justice program,
with attention to holding both juveniles and their parents accountable
for criminal acts.
191
VII. CONCLUSION
According to one commentator, "We have an adult problem, not
a children problem .... If we can get our adults together, the chil-
dren will naturally fall in line."'192 While it seems appropriate to look
to parental action or inaction as a cause of juvenile delinquency, it is
inappropriate to focus on it as the only cause. We will likely see a
flux of parental responsibility statutes introduced in state legislatures
this year, and we have yet to see whether some form of the Youth
Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999 will be enacted by the federal
government. These statutes, if and when adopted, should not operate
alone if we want to see true results on the problem of juvenile delin-
quency. "[W]e must continue to pursue a multiplicity of solutions to
this complex social problem; parental liability laws should be ac-
knowledged as only a partial solution .. 193
Pamela K. Graham*
balanced prevention/punishment reform as proposed in this Comment.
191. See NCSL I, supra note 6.
192. Zolman, supra note 34, at 229 (quoting Nia Keeling, family outreach
worker).
193. Chapin, supra note 36, at 626.
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APPENDIX
The Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, S. 995, 106th
Cong. § 204 (emphasis added).
The Senate version of the bill reads:
Sec. 204. Responsibility of Adults for Death and Injury
Caused by Child Access to Firearms.
See. 922 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"(aa) Prohibition Against Giving Children Access to
Firearms. -
(1) Definition of Child. - In this subsection, the term
"child" means an individual who has not attained the
age of 18 years.
(2) Penalties. - Except as provided in paragraph (3), any
person who -
(A) keeps a loaded firearm, or an unloaded firearm,
and ammunition for the firearm, any one of which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce, within any premises that is un-
der the custody or control of that person; and
(B) knows or recklessly disregards the risk, that a
child is capable of gaining access to the firearm;
and
(C) (i) knows, or recklessly disregards the risk, that
a child will use thefirearm to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury ... to the child or any other per-
son; or
(ii) possession of the firearm by the child is
unlawful under Federal or State law; and
(D) the child uses the firearm to cause death or serious
bodily injury to the child or any other person,
shall be imprisoned not more than 3 years, fined
under this title, or both.
(3) Exceptions. - Paragraph (2) does not apply, if-
(A) at the time the child obtained access, the firearm
was secured with a secure gun storage or safety
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device;
(B) the person is a peace officer, a member of the
Armed Forces, or a member of the National
Guard, and the child obtains the firearm during, or
incidental to, the performance of the official duties
of the person in that capacity;
(C) the child uses the firearm in a lawful act of self-
defense or defense of 1 or more other persons; or
(D) the person has no reasonable expectation, based
on objective facts and circumstances, that a child
is likely to be present on the premises on which
the firearm is kept."
